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Executive Summary 
 
Honduras is the third poorest country in Latin America, ahead of only Nicaragua and Guyana. It has 
a long history of political and economic instability, which had finally been brought under control by 
the end of the 1980s. This cycle of relative stability ended with the coup d’état that overthrew 
President Manuel Zelaya Rosales on June 28, 2009. The current instability is worsening the country’s 
economic downturn, and also preventing Honduras from adopting the measures needed to counter-
act the effect of the global recession on the economy. 
 
Despite several efforts to promote economic development, the most important changes in the 
country’s insertion into the global economy came only after the creation of the Export Processing 
Zone system in 1987. This, along with a very cheap labor force and close political ties to the U.S., 
turned Honduras into an attractive site for multinational firms to locate their production facilities, 
especially textiles.  Employment within export processing zones (EPZ), and free zones (FZ) 
increased more than 40 percent per year from 1990 to 1996. By 2005 the maquila sector accounted 
for about 65 percent of total exports. 
However, despite the lowest wages in Central America, Honduras’ maquila sector has had trouble in 
recent years competing with Asian producers, where wages are much lower.  As a result, the maquila 
share of exports has fallen significantly in recent years, and Honduras has been unable to move up 
the value-added chain of economic development. 
 
The economy nonetheless did very well during the Zelaya administration, which took office in 
January of 2006. GDP grew by 6.6 percent in 2006 and 6.3 percent in 2007; it slowed in 2008 due to 
the world recession, but still came in at 4 percent. Honduras was the fastest growing country in 
Central America after Costa Rica. Poverty was reduced significantly in the first two years (for which 
there are data), from 65.8 percent of households in 2005 to 60.2 percent in 2007.  Inequality also fell: 
From 2005 to 2006, the percent of income captured by the lower (poorer) deciles went from 2.1 to 
2.5, and the percent going to the intermediate deciles also increased from 35 to almost 39 percent. 
At the same time, the share captured by the richest segment fell, from nearly 47 percent in 2005 to 
42.4 percent in 2006. 
 
Inflation remained under control; it peaked at 10.8 percent in 2008, but this was due mainly to the 
worldwide spike in commodity import prices, and it was soon to come down. (The year-over-year 
inflation rate last September was only 3.1 percent). The current account deficit also hit high levels in 
2007 and 2008, peaking at –11.7 percent of GDP in 2008; however, this retreated into positive 
territory in 2009 as import prices and demand for imports fell. The Zelaya government was able to 
maintain a sufficient level of reserves and a stable exchange rate. The government also used 
expansionary monetary policy, in the form of lowering reserve requirements, to counter-act the 
global credit crunch as it hit Honduras in 2008. 
 
The government also enacted a 60 percent increase in the minimum wage, which brought an 
enormous adverse reaction from the employers’ community. In spite of their efforts, the Supreme 
Court upheld the increase, partly on the grounds that even with the increase, the Honduran 
minimum wage did not cover the basic consumption basket in urban or rural areas. Prior research 
has also shown that increases in the minimum wage in Honduras have a significant part in reducing 
poverty and extreme poverty.  The government also significantly increased access to education for 
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an estimated 450,000 children through the abolition of school fees, and implemented a more-than-
25-percent increase in the number of children receiving free school lunches. 
 
The economy has continued to be hit by the world recession in 2009, and is particularly vulnerable 
due to its high dependency on remittances, which peaked at more than 21 percent of GDP in 2006. 
The four months of instability since the coup d’état have combined with these external shocks to 
take a toll on economic performance.  
 
From July 2 to November 3, international reserves at the central bank have fallen by $444.6 million, 
or 18.4%. The current level of $1.98 billion represents a level of about 3.2 months of imports, which 
is at the margin of sufficiency. At present, Honduras would have access to another $163.9 million of 
reserves from the IMF, under a special allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) created this year 
and extended to all member countries. However, because the de facto government is not recognized 
internationally, access to these reserves has been denied by the Fund. 
 
The tourism sector, which grew at a rapid 9 percent last year, is expected to decline this year because 
of both the U.S. and world recession, and also because of the crisis.  
 
Some of the impacts of the current crisis are difficult to quantify but they are undoubtedly 
significant. Jesus Canahuati, vice president of the nation’s chapter of the Business Council of Latin 
America, estimates that the curfew imposed by the de facto regime cost the economy $50 million 
per day. 
 
From January to August, the IMAE (Indice Mensual de Actividad Economica) has shown a 3.4 
percent decline, compared to growth of 2.4% in the same period from 2008.  
 
As recently as June, Consensus Economic had forecast 0.7 percent growth for 2009; by late 
September this was lowered to negative 2.6 percent; some of this undoubtedly reflects the impact of 
the crisis. 
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Introduction 
 
From the early 1900s until the early 1980s, Honduras had a long history of political and economic 
instability. Exports centered mostly around bananas from the first decade of the 20th Century until 
the 1950s, when attempts were made to promote diversification. Coffee and other agricultural 
products became important as a result of these efforts and, by 1960, bananas’ share in total exports 
was down to 45 percent.1 Shortly thereafter, and as a result of the newly created Central American 
Common Market (CACM), some industrial products were exported to other Central American 
countries. This manufacturing activity, however, declined drastically after the war with El Salvador in 
1969 and the Honduran decision to leave the CACM. 
 
The first election after nearly a decade of military rule was held in November 1981; the winner, 
Roberto Suazo Córdoba, assumed the presidency in January 1982. Legal and legitimate electoral 
processes were held thereafter every four years, without interruption. This cycle of political stability 
ended last June 28, when President Manuel Zelaya was removed from office by force. 
 
Despite several efforts to promote economic development, the most important changes in the 
country’s insertion into the global economy came after the creation of the Export Processing Zone 
system in 1987. This, along with a very cheap labor force and close political ties to the U.S., turned 
Honduras into an attractive site for multinational firms to locate their production facilities, especially 
textiles.2 Employment within export processing zones (EPZ), and free zones (FZ) increased more 
than 40 percent per year from 1990 to 1996..3, 4  
 
The transformation of the production structure, along with a closer integration with the 
international economy, however, has not brought much change to Honduran society, and the 
country remains among the poorest in Latin America. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the main characteristics of the Honduran 
economy in the last few years. The information available at the time of this writing allows for a look 
at the first two years of the Zelaya administration (when information allows, a third year is included) 
and for comparisons with the preceding years. 
                                                 
1 Merrill 1995. 
2 Export processing industries in Honduras (in what is commonly referred to the maquila sector) may operate under two 
alternative laws: the Free Zone Law (FZ) and the Export Processing Zone Law (EPZ). The FZs, on the one hand, 
allow entire areas (like municipalities) to be turned into Free Zones which can only be managed by the government. 
The EPZs, on the other hand, are developed as industrial parks by private administrators. Both of these systems use 
several incentives, including exemption from income and customs taxes, total freedom to dispose of foreign exchange 
reserves, as well as simplified legal and administrative paperwork. More details on FZs and EPZs in Honduras may be 
found in Jenkins, Esquivel and Larraín 1998, 21-22. 
3 See Jenkins, Esquivel and Larraín 1998, 27-28.  
4 The growth of the EPZ system during the 1990s was a generalized phenomenon in Central America; according to an 
ILO report, Central America had some 922,000 workers in the EPZ systems in 2006 (Singa Boyenge 2007, 12-13). 
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General Information: Some Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
As noted above, Honduras is, by all standards, a poor country. However, the production structure is 
no longer centered on a few agricultural crops or mineral extraction, exports have grown, and 
foreign multinationals are now located in various areas within the national territory. Export 
processing activities provide numerous employment opportunities and, along with foreign 
remittances from Hondurans living abroad, generate considerable amounts of much-needed foreign 
exchange. And yet, in 2007, Honduras occupied position number 112 of 182 countries in the 
Human Development rankings published by the United Nations Development Program.5  
 
According to the World Bank, Honduras, with a per capita income of US$3,870, is the third poorest 
country in Latin America (only ahead of Guyana and Nicaragua, with US$2,510 and US$2,620, 
respectively).6 Structural adjustment programs signed with the World Bank in the early 1980s and 
1990s included strict conditions that proved difficult to attain.7 As in other countries, the whole 
process was tied to macroeconomic stabilization involving reductions in the fiscal deficit and tight 
monetary policy, both of which generated unemployment and uncertainty in the business sector.8 
 
                                                 
5 By comparison, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, were in positions 122, 124, and 106, respectively. See United 
Nations Development Program 2009, Statistical Annex, Table H. 
6 Refers to Gross National Income, PPP, current international prices. See World Bank 2009. 
7 The first structural adjustment program (SAP) was signed by then-President Jose Azcona in 1988. The program was 
also supported by the International Monetary Fund and the USAID, but it did not start until Rafael Callejas became 
President in 1990. Other programs were signed and implemented with several international financial institutions 
thereafter, but usually with conditionalities that became difficult to attain. The SAPs signed by Honduras usually 
required privatization, devaluation, export promotion and increases in the price of public services. See Bull 2005. 
8  Schulz and Sundloff-Schulz 1994. 
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Production and Growth 
Honduras is the second smallest of the five economies in Central America. As shown in Figure 1, in 
terms of per capita income, Honduras is ahead of Nicaragua, but behind the other three countries in 
the area. It is worth noticing, however, that during the three years in the Zelaya period, per capita 
GDP increased consistently, and by a wider margin than during the previous administration. 
 
FIGURE 1 
CENTRAL AMERICA: PER CAPITA GDP (CURRENT US$) 
Source: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2009a, 2009b. 
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In Figure 2 we see real GDP growing more than 6 percent per year from 2004 to 2007. During 
2006 and 2007, the rates of GDP growth were higher than they had been during the previous four 
years, with Honduras ahead of all the countries in the region but Costa Rica. In 2008 the expansion 
slowed down as a result of the world recession, but output still grew 4 percent in real terms, the 
highest rate in the region.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Central America: Real GDP Growth Rates 
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Figure 3 shows the Honduran participation in the region’s GDP, which remains small, but shows a 
slight increase from 2006 to 2008. These gains in the Honduran share result mainly from output 
growth that is faster than that of El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Central America: Share of Each Country in Region’s GDP (Percent) 
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Price Stability 
After a period of relative stability from 2002 to 2006, inflation started to pick up again in 2007 and 
reached 10.8 percent in 2008. (See Figure 4). As in other small and open economies, commodity 
and oil prices were among the most important determinants of inflationary pressures in 2008. A 
comparison with Central American neighbors shows that in 2006, Honduras had the second lowest 
inflation rate, only behind El Salvador (which operates within a dollarized economy); a similar 
situation occurred in 2007. In 2008 prices did pick up but, as already explained, this was mostly 
caused by international commodity prices.9 As expected, prices have grown at a much slower pace 
during 2009; the year-over-year inflation rate last September was only 3.1 percent.10  
 
FIGURE 4 
Central America: Inflation Rates 
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Honduras 8.1 6.8 9.2 7.8 5.3 8.9 10.8 2.5 
Nicaragua 3.9 6.5 9.3 9.6 9.5 16.9 13.8 0.2 
Source: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2009b. 
Note: Data from 2009 refer to the inflation rate between December 2008 and September 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9    Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2009b. 
10  Banco Central de Honduras 2009a. 
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Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Various features of Honduran macroeconomic policy are summarized in Table 1. The Zelaya 
administration reduced the fiscal deficit, as a percent of GDP, from 3.35 in 2005 to 2.34 in 2008. In 
2006 and 2007, the deficit was held at 1.12 and 2.9 percent of GDP, respectively. It is also worth 
noticing the important decrease in public debt, as a percent of GDP, which went from almost 45 
percent in 2005 to 17.4 percent in both 2007 and 2008. 
 
On the monetary policy side, Table 1 shows how a significant reduction of the lending rate11 (from 
18.5 percent in December 2005 to 16.5 percent in 2007) encouraged vigorous growth of credit to 
the private sector, in real terms, during 2006 and 2007. The resulting economic growth also 
contributed to a significant reduction in the open unemployment rate in the urban sector, which 
went from 6.5 percent in 2005 to 4.9 and 4.0 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
 
Two elements, however, combined to prevent the continuation of this trend. First, inflation 
pressures from the international economy fueled higher price growth, which the central bank 
attempted to control by raising the policy interest rate (from 6 percent at the end of 2006 to 7.75 in 
December 2008); these policy moves put pressure on the lending rate, which went from 16.5 percent 
in 2007 to 20.0 percent in 2008. 
 
A second element preventing the continuation of Honduran growth was the international financial 
crisis and world recession, which led to a scarcity of international funding that, in turn, also 
contributed to the rise in lending rates. According to ECLAC, Honduran financial institutions 
remained solid, and with limited exposure to contagion from the international financial crisis. 
However, foreign banks operating in the country were advised by their parent companies to 
maintain higher levels of liquidity, thus reducing availability of credit.12 
 
The international situation only allowed for a limited increase in credit during 2008 (0.55 percent in 
real terms, as seen in Table 1). The government’s response to the credit crunch in that year was to 
reduce the legal reserve requirement from 12 percent to 10 percent, thus freeing nearly US$95 
million for use by the banking system in credit operations.13 The reserve requirement was later 
pushed down to zero for loan requests where at least 60 percent of the lending resources would go 
to production activities.14 The government also submitted funding requests to various external 
sources, including the government of Venezuela (US$30 million to be assigned to the Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario - BANADESA), and US$100 million through the Bolivarian 
Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA).15 The Honduran private sector reacted 
favorably to these moves, which were aimed at mitigating the impact of the global recession on the 
local economy.16 
                                                 
11  Data on the “lending rate” refer to a weighted average of the annual rates charged on loans provided by commercial 
banks. 
12  By mid 2008, foreign banks in Honduras held 20 percent of total assets in the Honduran banking system. See 
ECLAC 2008, 113. 
13  ECLAC 2008, 113. 
14  See Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2008, 44. 
15  ECLAC 2008, 114. 
16  La Prensa 2008. 
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TABLE 1 
Honduras: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (Percent, unless otherwise indicated) 
  Dec 2003  Dec 2004  Dec 2005  Dec 2006  Dec 2007  Dec 2008 
Real growth of credit 4.06 -0.04 9.82 21.58 31.78 0.55 
Nominal lending rate 20.24 19.45 18.36 16.6 16.46 20.04 
Policy interest rate NA NA 7.00 6.00 7.50 7.75 
Unemployment rate  
(open, urban sector)1 7.60 8.00 6.50 4.90 4.00 NA 
Government budget balance 
(percent of GDP)2 -5.67 -3.40 -3.35 -1.12 -2.90 -2.34 
Public debt (percent of GDP)1 NA 59.60 44.70 28.90 17.40 17.40 
Nominal exchange rate 17.93 18.81 19.03 19.03 19.03 19.03 
Net international reserves  
(millions US$)2 1,282.48 1,800.70 2,162.81 2,613.68 2,514.31 2,460.00 
Terms of trade1 88.00 87.20 87.20 83.20 81.60 79.40 
Source: Banco Central de Honduras 
Note: 1 Information from ECLAC (2009). 2 Information from Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
 
During 2009, the measures described above to face the global slowdown were complemented by 
reductions in the policy interest rate, which went from 7.75 in December 2008, to 3.5 percent in 
June 2009 (see Figure 5). When the rate went up on July 14, Zelaya and his cabinet were no longer 
in power and decisions were being made by members of the de-facto government. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Honduras: Policy Interest Rate (Percent)  
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Going back to Table 1 it may be seen that net international monetary reserves remained at 
reasonable levels, as will be explained in more detail in the next section. The sharp deterioration of 
the terms of trade did not hurt the level of reserves, partly as a result of strong remittances from 
abroad and strong merchandise exports. The general situation in the Honduran foreign sector 
allowed the nominal exchange rate to remain at 19.03 lempiras per dollar. 
The Foreign Sector 
Total exports rose 8.7 percent in 2008, compared to lower percentages in 2007 and 2006 (6.21 and 
4.12, respectively). As described in Table 2, the expansion is explained mostly by the performance 
of merchandise exports, which rose more than 20 percent in 2008, an important recovery from 
weaker results in 2007 and 2006. This growth is partly explained by coffee, bananas, and palm oil, 
which contribute a combined 20 percent of the merchandise category (see Table 3). 
 
TABLE 2 
Honduras: Total Export Growth Rates (Percent) 
Product/sector 2004 2005(p) 2006(p) 2007(p) 2008(p) 
Merchandise Exports 21.60 16.75 10.23 8.73 20.38 
  Coffee 44.34 32.16 16.24 21.29 20.66 
  Banana 56.64 24.69 -7.30 19.94 32.58 
  Palm oil 6.91 -5.12 32.89 47.68 66.05 
  Cultured shrimp 9.28 -3.33 25.62 -2.96 -32.01 
  Cigars 20.01 5.51 -0.38 9.74 9.26 
  Plastic and plastic manufactures 137.24 18.32 33.43 -14.47 29.58 
  Tilapia 42.30 74.89 17.34 14.45 18.28 
  Textiles 143.28 226.92 -25.83 36.70 -8.54 
  Soap and detergent 56.25 -20.30 7.97 -9.27 25.78 
  Other products 3.97 10.28 10.85 -0.97 21.72 
        
Goods for transformation (GFT) 20.85 9.06 0.56 4.61 0.95 
        
Total Merchandise + GFT 21.11 11.76 4.12 6.21 8.69 
Source: Banco Central de Honduras 
Note: (p) indicates preliminary data. 
 
The solid results in merchandise trade in 2008 were accompanied by a meager less-than-one-percent 
growth in the so-called “goods for transformation” category (GFT), commonly referred to as “the 
maquila sector.”17 Table 3 shows that the performance of this sector has been rather irregular during 
the last years, which is unfortunate, since it represented almost 56 percent of total exports in 2008. 
                                                 
17  These GFT are produced within Free Zones or Export Processing Zones, which were described in a previous 
footnote. 
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TABLE 3 
Honduras: Composition of Exports of Merchandise and Goods for Transformation (Percent) 
Product 2003 2004 2005(p) 2006(p) 2007(p) 2008(p) 
Coffee 5.22 6.22 7.36 8.21 9.38 10.41 
Banana 3.62 4.69 5.23 4.66 5.26 6.41 
Palm oil 1.51 1.33 1.13 1.44 2.01 3.06 
Cultured shrimp 3.20 2.89 2.50 3.02 2.76 1.72 
Cigars and Cigarettes 1.61 1.60 1.51 1.45 1.49 1.50 
Plastic and plastic manufactures 0.57 1.11 1.18 1.51 1.22 1.45 
Tilapia 0.45 0.53 0.83 0.94 1.01 1.10 
Textiles 0.19 0.39 1.14 0.81 1.05 0.88 
Soap and detergent 0.93 1.20 0.85 0.89 0.76 0.88 
Other products 17.71 15.21 15.00 15.97 14.89 16.68 
Goods for transformation (GFT)1 64.97 64.83 63.26 61.10 60.18 55.90 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Banco Central de Honduras 2009c. 
Notes: (p) indicates preliminary data. 1 Refers to bienes para la transformación, commonly known as maquila. 
 
The relative weight of GFT has declined steadily since 2003, as shown in Table 4. Interestingly, low 
Honduran wages (which remained for many years among the lowest in Central America), and 
participation in the CAFTA-DR18 agreement have not prevented this decline. This should come as 
no surprise since almost 87 percent of exports in the GFT sector are generated by textiles and textile 
materials (see Table 4), activities in which various Asian nations have a competitive advantage due 
to their lower wages. Unfortunately, the lack of location-specific assets, such as a skilled labor force 
and various forms of physical and social infrastructure makes it difficult for Honduras to move up 
the value added chain, towards segments that are not as heavily dependent on low wages and/or lack 
of labor rights. The increase in exports associated with machinery and equipment, however, denotes 
an attempt at moving towards other areas in foreign trade. 
 
Paradoxically, the dynamic export activities within the Honduran economy have recently been those 
that are based on commodities or primary products, which are precisely the ones that behave in the 
least dynamic fashion within the global economy. It is thus clear that important changes have to be 
promoted if this country is to move to a higher level of development. We will elaborate a bit more 
on this argument in the next sections. 
 
TABLE 4 
Goods for Transformation1: Composition of Exports (Percent) 
Sector 2003 2004  2005 (p)  2006 (p)  2007 (p)  2008 (p)
Textiles and textile materials 91.3 90.2 85.8 85.0 85.0 86.6
Machinery and equipment 6.6 7.1 10.1 13.7 13.4 11.7
Other products and/or materials 2.0 2.8 4.1 1.3 1.6 1.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Banco Central de Honduras 2009c. 
Notes: 1 Goods that are produced within Free Zones or Export Processing Zones, traditionally referred to as maquila. 
(p) indicates preliminary data. 
 
                                                 
18   CAFTA-DR is the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. 
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Figure 6 shows more clearly the impact of the global recession on merchandise exports. It is clear 
that sales to other countries started to fall in November 2008, and have continued to decline 
throughout the portion of 2009 for which data is available. Unfortunately the falloff in export 
demand has combined with an uncertain political situation which has clearly delayed the application 
of counter-cyclical policy measures.  
  
FIGURE 6 
Honduras: Recent Evolution of Merchandise Trade1  
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Merchandise imports also fell in 2009; in fact, as shown in Table 5, every single import category saw 
a significant decrease with respect to 2008. The reduction in the price of oil and of raw materials on 
the one hand, and intermediate inputs on the other hand, contributed to the large decline in these 
categories. In contrast, during 2008, the opposite situation in terms of international prices led to 
substantial increases in the oil and raw material bills. 
 
TABLE 5 
Honduras: Structure and Evolution of Imports 1 (January through May of Each Year) 
Share in total imports  (percent)  Rate of growth (percent) 
Type of import 
2008 2009  2008 2009 
Consumption goods 26.89 34.44 22.17 -4.79 
Fuel, lubricants and electricity 22.05 14.63 63.75 -50.68 
  Fuel 21.42 13.93 65.07 -51.67 
  Lubricants 0.58 0.70 18.60 -10.12 
  Electricity 0.05 0.00  - -  - - 
Raw materials and intermediate products 26.94 28.24 65.07 -51.67 
Construction materials 3.51 3.61 19.79 -23.60 
Capital goods 18.34 16.70 29.09 -32.30 
Others 2.26 2.38 5.16 -21.80 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 31.20 -25.66 
Source: Banco Central de Honduras. 
Notes: All data preliminary. 1 Excludes the “goods for transformation” sector. 
 
On December 22, 2007, Honduras became a member of Petrocaribe, a pact for energy cooperation 
involving 18 countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, including among others, Venezuela, 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Obviously the center piece of this pact is Venezuela, which 
provides substantial volumes of oil with favorable credit conditions to the member countries.19 In 
the case of Honduras, it was initially disclosed that the country would purchase between $750 and 
$800 million worth of Venezuelan oil (approximately 40 percent of the Honduran oil bill in 2008). 20 
Membership in Petrocaribe allows the country to only pay 40 percent of the total bill in cash; the 
remaining 60 percent is paid in kind (i.e. with exports of goods and services), over a 25 year period, 
with two grace years and a 1 percent annual interest rate. 
 
Even though oil prices declined considerably after the second half of 2008, over the whole year, 
higher consumption volumes made up for the lower prices; as a result, imports of fuel and lubricants 
increased more than 63 percent during that year. 
 
As expected from the behavior of imports and exports, the current account balance went, as a 
percent of GDP, from -3.73 in 2006, to -9.94 in 2007 and to -13.80 in 2008, as seen in Table 6. The 
lack of strength in the export processing zones did not help the Honduran economy during 2006 
and 2007, when high commodity prices raised the import bill. And during 2008 the slowdown in the 
global economy must have prevented further investment and production in the maquila sectors. 
 
Remittances from other countries have become a very large portion of GDP, peaking at 21.3 
percent of GDP in 2006.  In recent years they have played an increasing role in providing foreign 
                                                 
19   For more information on Petrocaribe, see http://www.petrocaribe.org/. 
20   See La Nación 2008a. 
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exchange. They are expected to decline during 2009, but hopefully not to the extent of causing a 
major imbalance within the balance of payments.21 According to a 2007 household survey, 
remittances from abroad represent, on average, 9.5 percent of household income.22 
 
The reduction in the balance of the capital and financial account, and in foreign direct investment, 
provide a clear picture of the international economic situation: stricter financing conditions on 
foreign funds, and lower levels of investment by the multinationals as a result of more pessimistic 
perceptions on the recovery of the world economy. International monetary reserves, which were 
enough to cover 5.6 months of imports in 2006, fell to 3.6 months of imports in 2008. 
 
TABLE 6 
Honduras: Selected Components of the Balance of Payments (Percent of GDP) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (p) 2007 (p) 2008 (p)
Current account -3.58 -6.72 -7.65 -2.98 -3.73 -9.94 -13.80
Family remittances 9.74 10.23 12.83 18.20 21.30 20.60 19.60
Capital and financial account 3.24 4.29 11.26 6.96 9.35 9.00 11.80
Foreign direct investment 3.42 4.74 6.23 6.14 6.17 6.61 6.10
Net International Reserves (in months of imports)1 5.84 4.84 5.56 5.40 5.60 5.00 3.60
Source: Banco Central de Honduras 2009c. 
Notes: (p) indicates preliminary data. 1 Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2009a.          
 
 
                                                 
21  The situation, however, might change. A recent study by the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that 
remittances to Latin America from the U.S. may fall by 11 percent in 2009 as a result of the recession. See Inter-
American Development Bank 2009. 
22  The other major sources of income are wages (45 percent) and proceeds from self-employment (35.7 percent). See 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Honduras 2007. 
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Poverty, Social and Political Conflict, and the Need for 
Reforms 
As explained in the first section of this report, Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin 
America; it is also a country of sharp contrasts between the urban and rural populations, and 
between the rich and the poor. Within urban zones, 97.7 percent of the housing units have access to 
electricity, but this rate drops drastically (to 49.8 percent) in the rural sector.23 The head of the urban 
household completes, on average, 6.4 years of schooling while their counterparts in the rural regions 
only complete 4.6 years of schooling; perceived income in the urban areas is twice as big as that in 
the rural areas.24 
 
In 2001, as shown in Table 7, more than 64 percent of Honduran households lived below the 
poverty line. This proportion declined slightly over the next two years, only to move up again in 
2005 to 66 percent. During the two first years of the Zelaya administration this percentage fell 
significantly to 62.1 and 60.2, respectively, in 2006 and 2007. 
 
TABLE 7 
Central America: Percent of Households Below the Poverty Line1 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Costa Rica 20.60 20.30 20.60 18.50 21.70 21.20 20.24 16.73 17.70 
El Salvador 38.79 38.81 36.77 36.10 34.59 35.10 30.73  34.59 NA 
Guatemala2 56.19 NA NA NA NA NA 51.00 NA NA 
Honduras NA 64.40 63.90 63.50 64.30 65.80 62.10 60.20 NA 
Nicaragua2 NA 45.80 NA NA NA 46.2 NA NA NA 
Source: Socio Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
Notes: 1 Refers to moderate poverty.  2 Refers to individuals, instead of households. 
 
Inequality is shown in Figure 7 as the share of each decile of the population in total income; it 
decreased in 2006. From 2005 to 2006, the percent of income captured by the lower (poorer) deciles 
went from 2.1 to 2.5 percent, and the percent going to the intermediate deciles also increased from 
35 to almost 39 percent. At the same time, the share captured by the richest segment fell, from 
nearly 47 percent in 2005 to 42.4 percent in 2006.25 
 
                                                 
23  Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Honduras 2007. 
24  Ibid. 
25  The most widely used indicator of inequality, the Gini coefficient, was only available up to 2005 when it reached 
0.55. By comparison, the coefficients, also in 2005, for Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica were 0.52, 0.49, and 
0.47, respectively.  
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FIGURE 7 
Honduras: Income Inequality 
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ource: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). 
 
Minimum Wage Reform 
The above information on poverty and inequality is hardly surprising, and we have already discussed 
the low ranking Honduras has in terms of the human development index. Figure 8 shows that, up 
until 2008, this country had, along with Nicaragua, the lowest minimum wage rates in the region. 
Not only are these numbers very low, but also the gap with respect to the country’s Central 
American neighbors is striking. 
 
On December 23, 2008, and after one month of fruitless negotiations between workers and 
employers, the Zelaya administration decided to increase the monthly minimum wage in the urban 
area from 3,400 Lempiras (US$178.66) to 5,500 Lempiras (US$289.02), about a 60 percent 
increase.26 In the rural areas, the minimum wage was increased to 4,055 Lempiras (US$213.08). The 
government decree (reference number 374-STSS-08), set to take effect on January 1st, 2009, was 
given a warm reception by labor, but generated bitter reactions from employers. 
 
Before the government’s decree, the workers’ goal was to bring the minimum wage to the level of 
the basic consumption bundle: 6,200 Lempiras (US$325.80). With the changes approved in 
December, the minimum wage in the urban sector would cover 88.71 percent of the basic bundle, 
while the coverage in the rural sector would only reach 65.40 percent. 
                                                 
26  Heraldo 2008 and Hondurasnews 2009. The conversion from Lempiras to U.S. dollars was made with a rate of 19.03 
Lempiras for one dollar. This rate is published at the Banco Central de Honduras’ web page, 
http://www.bch.hn/tipo_de_cambiom.php 
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FIGURE 8 
Central America: Minimum Wage Rates Per Month (US$) 
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During the wage negotiations, employers argued that, due to the world recession, the minimum 
wage should not be modified.27 After the December 23rd decree, the business sector filed numerous 
appeals to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the wage increase violated their constitutional 
rights. Almost one month after the government’s announcement, the Asociación Nacional de 
Industriales (ANDI) suggested to their affiliates that they should avoid paying the new salaries 
before the appeal was resolved.28 By February 2009 the Constitutional Court had received more than 
500 appeals from various groups within the business sector.29 
 
The employers’ position not only included appeals to the Supreme Court; shortly after the release of 
the government decree, ANDI’s President recommended that firms fire one out of every three 
employees.30 He later explained that if the Court ruled against ANDI, the next day there were going 
to be firings; but if it ruled in ANDI’s favor, then workers, businesses, and government would 
negotiate a new minimum wage.31 
 
The legal office of the Honduran government (Ministerio Público) recommended in April that the 
Supreme Court reject the appeals submitted by employers on the grounds that the wage increase did 
not imply a violation of constitutional rights.32 The Ministerio Público’s recommendation was not 
                                                 
27  Ibid. 
28  La Prensa 2009a. 
29  El Heraldo 2009a. 
30  La Prensa 2009b. 
31  El Heraldo 2009b. 
32 El Heraldo 2009c. 
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binding; however, towards the end of April the Supreme Court ruled that the increase in the 
minimum wage “is consistent with constitutional rights and therefore stands.”33 The Supreme Court 
indicated that the law allows the government to determine the minimum wage, and that the 
government must guarantee fair remuneration. The Court further argued that the government’s 
decision on the minimum wage had been based on a socioeconomic study of the labor market which 
considered elements like the basic consumption bundle and cost of living estimates by the Instituto 
Hondureño de Estadística. With regard to the businesses’ claims that the wage increase would lead 
to firing of workers, the Court argued that the high cost of the basic consumption bundle was an 
element of social justice which should lead to reasonable capital and labor relations.34 
 
It is clear that the decision to raise salaries generated very adverse reactions from the business sector, 
and that after the decision of the Supreme Court some workers did lose their jobs.35 But the 
situation already described in terms of poverty, inequality, and human development warranted 
strong actions regarding minimum wages. 
 
One may argue that a 60 percent increase was excessive, but the truth is that, even after the raise, 
wages do not cover the basic consumption bundle. And there are also the final arguments from the 
Supreme Court, which very clearly support the decision to raise salaries on the grounds that it is 
related to the cost of the basic consumption bundle and to other elements in the Honduran cost of 
living. 
In an interesting article, Gindling and Terrel (2006) show that in Honduras: “wage increases do 
reduce extreme poverty: a 10% increase in the minimum wage will reduce the probability that an 
average individual in the labor force is in extreme poverty by 1.8%.” For large private firms: “a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage reduces extreme poverty and poverty by 2.0% and 1.9%, 
respectively.” Unfortunately, the authors also report that: “legal minimum wages apply to all 
employees in the private sector, although … they are complied with only in large private firms and 
not in small private firms.” 
 
To maintain the minimum wage at its then-current level, which was the position of the business 
community, would have allowed it to only cover 54 percent of the basic consumption bundle. This 
would have been one more step in pushing the country down to more poverty and inequality. 
 
Other Reforms 
The social reforms promoted during the Zelaya administration go well beyond the increase in the 
minimum wage. In particular, his administration removed one of the most critical barriers to 
education: the national policy of mandatory school fees. Abolishing these fees opened the doors of 
the elementary school system to more than 450,000 Honduran children.36 
 
                                                 
33  El Heraldo 2009d. Free translation by the author. 
34  Ibid. 
35  The bitterness on the side of business leaders became even clearer when, in January 2009, the head of ANDI issued 
the recommendation that those who had dollar accounts within the country take those dollars out and send them to 
another place. The recommendation came as a result of regulations related to the financial sector, but it is an 
interesting coincidence that it was issued in January 2009, just in the middle of the debates on the minimum wage 
increase (La Prensa 2009c). 
36   See OEI 2009. 
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Various food programs were also expanded, increasing the number of children receiving one free 
school meal to 1.068 million.37 As a comparison, 800,000 children benefited from the program in 
2005. 
 
 
The Current Situation 
 
As noted above, the economy slowed in 2009 with the world recession; however it was further hit by 
the instability and other adverse impacts of the crisis that followed the coup of June 28. Although it 
is sometimes difficult to separate these two effects, they are both significant. 
 
From July 2 to November 3, international reserves at the central bank have fallen by $444.6 million, 
or 18.4%. The current level of $1.98 billion represents a level of about 3.2 months of imports, which 
is at the margin of sufficiency.38 At present, Honduras would have access to another $163.9 million 
of reserves from the IMF, under a special allocation of SDRs created this year and extended to all 
member countries. However, because the de facto government is not recognized internationally, 
access to these reserves has been denied by the Fund. 
 
The tourism sector, which grew at a rapid 14.3 percent last year, is expected to decline this year 
because of both the U.S. and world recession, and also because of the crisis.39 The U.S. State 
Department has issued a “travel alert” recommending that U.S. citizens “defer all non-essential 
travel to Honduras” because of the “unstable political and security situation.”40 
 
Some of the impacts of the current crisis are difficult to quantify but they are undoubtedly 
significant. Jesus Canahuati, vice president of the nation’s chapter of the Business Council of Latin 
America, estimates that the curfew imposed by the de facto regime cost the economy $50 million 
per day.41 
 
From January to August, the IMAE (Indice Mensual de Actividad Economica) has shown a 3.4 
percent decline, compared to growth of 2.4% in the same period from 2008. The biggest drops are 
in Construction (-33.6%) and Industrial Manufacturing (-8.1%).42 
 
As recently as June, Consensus Economic had forecasted 0.7 percent growth for 2009; by late 
September this was lowered to negative 2.6 percent; some of this undoubtedly reflects the impact of 
the crisis.43 
 
Before the coup there was already a sharp fall-off in foreign direct investment (FDI), which dropped 
by 42.3 percent for the first half of 2009, as compared with 2008. The uncertainty created by the 
present crisis is expected to worsen this trend.44 
                                                 
37  World Food Programme 2009. 
38  Banco Central de Honduras 2009b. 
39  Instituto Hondureño de Turismo 2009. 
40  U.S. State Department 2009. 
41  Schmidt and Martinez 2009. 
42  Banco Central de Honduras 2009d. 
43  Plummer 2009. 
44  Banco Central de Honduras 2009f.  
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The coup government has also called for a 5.9 percent reduction in the budget for 2010, which 
would likely impede the recovery.45 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the Zelaya administration, the Honduran economy performed well: inflation was kept under 
control (except for 2008, when unusually high commodity prices pushed up inflation rates in several 
countries), the economy grew more than during the previous administration, and the levels of 
international monetary reserves allowed the country to maintain a stable foreign exchange rate. 
 
The country remains poor, but social and economic policy contributed to reduce inequality and 
poverty. Important reforms in education, like the ones mentioned above, will bring more 
opportunities to the poorest segments of the population. In the long-run, a more-educated labor 
force will allow for a more diversified economy and the possibility to move up the value added 
chain. 
 
An increase in the minimum wage in December 2008 caused much controversy and generated bitter 
reactions from the business sector. With the lowest wages in the Central American region, however, 
a step in that direction was necessary in order to fight poverty. Employers were originally planning 
for the minimum wage to remain unchanged and claimed later that the approved increase was too 
high. After the rise, however, the minimum wage was still not enough to cover the value of the basic 
consumption bundle. 
 
Currently, the combination of political instability and the world recession is taking its toll on 
economic performance and this will hurt the most vulnerable sectors of the population, unless 
measures are taken to protect them from the deteriorating economy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45  La Prensa 2009d. 
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